<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>Universalism on Greg Gauthier</title><link>https://gmgauthier.com/tags/universalism/</link><description>Recent content in Universalism on Greg Gauthier</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><copyright>Copyright 2024. All rights reserved.</copyright><lastBuildDate>Mon, 30 Dec 2019 12:19:44 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://gmgauthier.com/tags/universalism/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>A Potential Defense of Naturalistic Idealism</title><link>https://gmgauthier.com/post/a-potential-defense-of-naturalistic-idealism/</link><pubDate>Mon, 30 Dec 2019 12:19:44 +0000</pubDate><category>Blog: [philosophy]</category><enclosure url="https://gmgauthier.us-east-1.linodeobjects.com/blog/img/plato-thinking.png" type="image/jpg"/><description><![CDATA[ 
                    
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                    <p>One frequent appeal by determinists in the free will debate, involves invoking certain facts about neuroscience to deny efficacy to the conscious subject. In order to do this, one of the things the determinist must say, is that sense impulses are somehow processed unconsciously into a coherent whole, before they are presented to the &lsquo;conscious&rsquo; subject as an &rsquo;experience&rsquo;, and that this processing (along with pre-conscious processing of decision-making activity), shows that we are entirely causally determined.</p>
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